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Financing Chinese Capitalism: Principal Banks, Economic Crisis, 
and Chinese Family Firms in Singapore 
 
Abstract: It is a widely circulated myth that Chinese family firms rely exclusively on kinship ties 
and network capital to finance their domestic and international operations. In this empirical 
paper, I argue that large Chinese family firms are increasingly engaging with financial markets on 
a global scale. In order to finance their transnational business activities, these firms require 
financial services from banks beyond their domestic economies, resulting in a growing number 
and geographical spread of their principal banks. Second, I contend that as these Chinese family 
firms are diversifying their principal banks beyond a narrow confinement to other Chinese 
family-owned banks and financial institutions, their corporate performance will improve over 
time. Drawing upon time-series data (1996, 1998, and 2001) on over 150 Chinese family firms 
listed on the Singapore Exchange, I discuss both the geographical origins of their principal banks 
and the impact of the selection of these banks on their corporate performance before and after the 
1997/1998 Asian economic crisis. I also show whether there is a relationship between the use of 
principal banks by these Chinese family firms and their shareholding structures. 
 
Introduction 
For several centuries, millions of ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asian economies 
have engaged in a distinctive form of economic organization through which an informal array of 
Chinese entrepreneurs, traders, financiers and their closely-knit networks of family members and 
friends came to dominate the economic sphere of the very host economies they later considered 
“home”.1 While deeply rooted in the cultural norms and values of the traditional Chinese society 
in mainland China, this form of economic organization has evolved and adapted to dramatically 
different institutional contexts and political-economic conditions in the host economies, and, 
more recently, dynamic processes of economic globalization. In this paper, I use the term 
“Chinese capitalism” to describe this historically- and geographically-specific form of economic 
organization that refers to the social organization and political economy of the so-called 
“overseas Chinese”2 living outside mainland China, particularly in East and Southeast Asia (i.e. 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand). Chinese 
capitalism is a dominant mode of economic organization in East and Southeast Asia because of 
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not only its economic significance in the domestic economies, but also its complex and, yet, 
intricate social organization and authority systems. The sheer diversity and prowess of economic 
activities controlled and coordinated by these ethnic Chinese has enabled some of them to 
become the very foundations of their home economies. For example, Hong Kong-based Li Ka-
shing, whose empire controls about 16 % of Hong Kong’s stock exchange index (up from 12.7% 
in 1988 recorded in Redding, 1990: Table 7.4), caused the index to fall by 1.6 % on 23 December 
1998 with his remarks about the unfriendly business environment in Hong Kong (The Straits 
Times, 23 and 24 December 1998). In another example, Wee Cho Yaw, the second-generation 
banker from Singapore, and his family-controlled United Overseas Bank succeeded in taking 
over the fourth largest Singapore bank (Overseas Union Bank) on 26 October 2001. After the 
acquisition, the Wee family held controlling stakes in at least 14 companies publicly listed on the 
Singapore Exchange (10% of all listed Chinese family firms). UOB became the largest bank in 
Singapore, with an international network comprising 273 offices in 18 countries in the Asia-
Pacific region, Western Europe, and North America. 
 Amongst these glorified examples of unprecedented success of Chinese capitalism is a 
major paradox. It is a widely circulated myth that Chinese family firms rely exclusively on 
kinship ties and network capital to finance their domestic and international operations. If the 
economic prowess of these Chinese families becomes so significant and pervasive today, how is 
it that they managed to grow from small family businesses to giant transnational corporations 
within such a short period of time (often within one to two generations)? Even more paradoxical 
is the fact that most of this growth has taken place in developing economies in East and Southeast 
Asia that have weakly developed financial markets and banking systems. To unlock this mystery 
about the success of Chinese capitalism, we need to identify not only the sources of their first 
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“pots of gold”, so to speak, that enabled their early establishment and proliferation in domestic 
economies. But more importantly, we need to explain the fundamental basis of their successful 
transformations from small-scale family businesses to transnational corporate giants. In this quest 
for the fundamentals, we have to link the growth and development of Chinese family firms to 
financial markets – domestic and international. This linking is necessary because no matter how 
cooperative is the family network, there is a limit to the extent in which the network can provide 
capital and finance at such a huge scale required for dominating the domestic and regional 
economies. 
 In this paper, I aim to make an initial attempt to examine the ways in which Chinese 
capitalism is financed and their impact on corporate performance. I have chosen to focus mainly 
on publicly listed Chinese family firms, their principal banks, and their performance during the 
1996-2001 period. As prime movers of domestic economies, publicly listed Chinese family firms 
are an ideal representation of Chinese capitalism. Their dynamic interactions with and 
adaptations to the global economy also allow for an analysis of the transformations in Chinese 
capitalism in a global era (see also Yeung, 2004). Their very public nature means data and 
information about their financial activities are more readily available than privately owned family 
businesses throughout the Asian region. Drawing upon time-series data (1996, 1998, and 2001) 
on over 150 Chinese family firms publicly listed on the Singapore Exchange, I discuss both the 
geographical origins of their principal banks and the impact of the selection of these banks on 
their corporate performance before and after the 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis. I also show 
whether there is a relationship between the use of principal banks by these Chinese family firms 
and their shareholding structures. 
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 Two initial propositions can be put forward here. First, I argue that large Chinese family 
firms are increasingly engaging with financial markets on a global scale. In order to finance their 
transnational business activities, these firms require financial services from banks beyond their 
domestic economies, resulting in a growing number and geographical spread of their principal 
banks. Second, I contend that as these Chinese family firms are diversifying their principal banks 
beyond a narrow confinement to other Chinese family-owned banks and financial institutions, 
their corporate performance will improve over time. This argument is particularly relevant during 
the recent 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis because the collapse of several leading Chinese 
family firms were explained by their excessive reliance on the so-called “network capital” or – as 
Krugman (1998) argued – crony capitalism.3 In the next section, I outline the basis on which 
these propositions are made by offering a critical evaluation of the existing literature on Chinese 
capitalism. I then analyze the nature and geography of the principal banks employed by listed 
Chinese family firms in Singapore. The penultimate section discusses the relationships between 
their use of principal bankers, the role of family shareholding, and their corporate performance 
before and after the Asian economic crisis. Some implications for understanding the changing 
nature of Asian financial markets are offered in the concluding section. 
Network Capital in a Global Era 
 During the past fifteen years or so, social science studies of Chinese capitalism have 
produced a large body of literature on the nature and organization of Chinese capitalism.4 I have 
critically reviewed this literature elsewhere and will not repeat here again (see Yeung and Olds, 
2000a; 2004). Suffice to say that one of the most dominant interpretations amongst the various 
approaches has been the culturalist perspective that views Chinese capitalism as essentially 
organized around family-owned and controlled firms. Once established in East and Southeast 
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Asian economies, these Chinese family firms are seen as autonomous agents capable of self-
reproduction through (1) unfettered diversification under the whim of the founders or the 
patriarchs, (2) reliance on personal relationships and networks for capital, finance and business 
opportunities, and (3) relentless pursuit of political-economic alliances with domestic political 
elites. In her recent book on Chinese big business in Southeast Asia, Brown (2000: 42) concluded 
that “the cultural embeddedness of Chinese capitalism is a product of historical cultural factors. 
Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia, despite its heterogeneity, is not competitive. The 
accumulative, predatory tendencies of Chinese capitalism should not be mistaken for 
competitiveness. The Chinese links with the state, indigenous merchants, local elites and native 
technocrats, have varied from co-opting elites onto the boards of Chinese companies, to raising 
equity from indigenous sources, government capitals, to operating joint ventures with the state 
and with foreign multinationals and seeking technological alliances with foreign multinationals. 
The state has ranged from patron to partner, from investor to executor”. She further argued that 
“links with the state and the exploitation of Chinese networks ensured the survival of Chinese 
family enterprises, irrespective of whether they were in labour intensive industries or in capital 
intensive sectors. Competition was not a determining factor in the survival of Chinese family 
enterprises” (p.100; see also Yoshihara, 1988). 
How much then do we know about the financial aspect of Chinese capitalism? I think our 
knowledge remains rather limited for several reasons. First, much of the culturalist literature 
takes on an essentialist view of Chinese capitalism and therefore focuses narrowly on financial 
transactions among ethnic Chinese and their family networks. This view is premised on the 
essentialist assumption that ethnic Chinese, by virtue of their “Chineseness”, are culturally 
predisposed to transact with each other, even in the realm of financial arrangements (e.g. 
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McElderry, 1986; Nyaw and Chang, 1989; Brown, 1990). Clearly, this essentialist reading of the 
enormously diverse financial activities of Chinese family firms is problematic in today’s 
globalizing world in which financial capital flows much more effortlessly across borders and 
many Chinese family firms have much better knowledge and access to global financial markets. 
Taking an anti-essentialism perspective, for example, Nonini and Ong (1997: 3-4) argued that 
“Chineseness is no longer, if it ever was, a property or essence of a person calculated by that 
person’s having more or fewer ‘Chinese’ values or norms, but instead can only be understood 
only in terms of the multiplicity of ways in which ‘being Chinese’ is an inscribed relation of 
persons and groups to forces and processes associated with global capitalism and its modernities” 
(see also Nathan, 1993; Greenhalgh, 1994; Hodder, 1996; Dirlik, 1997; Ong, 1997; Yao, 1997; 
Ma, 2003). There is thus nothing invariably inherent about ethnic Chinese and their culture that 
compel them to rely only on network capital. The concept of culture in Chinese capitalism needs 
to be reconceptualized as a repertoire of historically- and geographically-specific practices that 
respond and adapt to changing local, regional and global circumstances rather than as 
permanently fixed mental and organizational structures that resist challenges and pressures to 
change (see also Hwang, 1987). Yang (2002: 469; original italics) contended that “it is better to 
treat guanxixue [the practice of relationships] not as an innate timeless given of Chinese culture, 
but as a historically situated set of cultural practices whose features and discourse have different 
meanings and different deployments in given historical moments and political contexts”. The 
essentialism in the culturalist perspective is particularly problematic because “it creates and 
legitimises the notion of ‘the Chinese’ as a distinct entity which can be explained by the implicit 
application of laws and forces which are presumed to exist” (Hodder, 1996: 12-3). To Wang 
(1999: 119), “Chineseness is of little interest unless it is changing or is forced to defend itself 
 8
against change. And underlying the changes that have been the most meaningful for them 
[Chinese in mainland China] this past century are the forces of modernization”. 
 Second, most studies tend to see the organization and behavior of Chinese family firms 
and their business networks as a somewhat static product of cultural adaptation – an inward-
oriented defense strategy in order to survive host country hostility, or of institutional structuring 
– a fixed and pre-determined outcome of the so-called “Chinese business system” (Whitley, 
1992; 1999; cf. Yeung, 2000a; 2004). Once established, such firms and their business networks 
are perceived to exhibit little internal and external transformations, but rather continue to exist as 
relatively “closed” (albeit evolving) socio-cultural formations, often anchored in one national or 
regional base. There are no provisions for change and transformation among Chinese family 
firms within the same “home” economies and across different Asian economies. It is as if these 
firms have a particular fate or destiny, depending very much on their cultural origins and/or 
institutional structures that almost leave a permanent imprint on these capitalist organizations. 
This static analysis of Chinese capitalism has much to do with its Weberian origin. Max Weber, 
for example, had argued that the significant influence of Confucian values in Chinese social 
thought was detrimental to the development of a rational instrumentalism essential to the rise of 
modern capitalism in North America and Western Europe: 
The patrimonial nature of administration and legislation created a realm of unshakeable 
sacred tradition alongside a realm of arbitrariness and favouritism. These political factors 
impeded development of industrial capitalism, sensitive to the lack of rational and 
calculable administration and law enforcement, whether in China, India, Islam, or 
elsewhere… Capital investment in industry is far too sensitive to such irrational use of 
authority and too dependent upon the possibility of calculating in advance the steady and 
rational operation of the state machinery to emerge under a government of this type. But 
the decision question is, why did this administration and judiciary [in Imperial China] 
remain so irrational from a capitalist point of view?… Rational industrial capitalism, 
which in the Occident found its specific locus in manufacturing, has been handicapped 
not only by the lack of a formally guaranteed law, a rational administration and judiciary, 
and by the ramifications of a system of rights to collect revenue, but also, basically, by the 
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lack of spiritual foundations. Above all it has been handicapped by the attitude rooted in 
the Chinese ‘ethos’ and peculiar to a class of officials and aspirants to office (Weber, 
[1920] 1983: 82-84; my emphasis). 
 
 Third, while small-scale Chinese family firms continue to receive the majority of research 
attention from academics, few resources have been devoted to the analysis of the growth of large 
business conglomerates (with public listed arms) that are controlled by ethnic Chinese (see 
Yeung, 1998; Gomez, 1999; Olds and Yeung, 1999; Zang, 1999; 2000; Brown, 2000; Yeung and 
Soh, 2000). These large business conglomerates are certainly more than the methodological 
proxy that “distinguishes any particular variety of capitalism” (Whitley, 1999: 65). They are 
indeed the prime movers and shakers in the economic organization of Chinese capitalism such 
that they cannot be analyzed simply as outcomes of abstract cultural norms and institutional 
structures in a post hoc manner. Instead, these large Chinese business conglomerates must be 
analyzed as an integral and critical constituent of Chinese capitalism. My empirical analysis in 
the next section therefore sheds light on how large Chinese family firms are engaging with global 
financial markets through their use of principal banks. As two Business Week editors recognized, 
“[a]s more and more Chinese network builders popped up each year in Forbes’ list of 
billionaires, there came a point when they began to shake their stigma of being ‘ersatz 
capitalists.’ Western investment bankers and consultants who learned more about the inner 
workings of a Dhanin Chearavanont, Li Ka-shing, Mochtar Riady, or Peter Woo found that these 
were serious business empires. They were men with a love for big deals who controlled powerful 
intelligence networks that gave them an inside track on deals” (Clifford and Engardio, 2000: 74). 
Even in Taiwan where small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been hailed as the backbone 
of the burgeoning economy (see Hamilton and Kao, 1990; Shieh, 1992; Hamilton, 1998; Hsing, 
1998), recent studies have shown an increasing concentration of corporate power in the hands of 
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the largest business groups, most of which are owned and controlled by Chinese families and are 
publicly listed on Taiwan’s stock exchange. Amsden and Chu (2002: Table 2-1; 27), for example, 
showed that the share of sales/GNP by Taiwan’s top 100 business groups has increased from 
32.3% in 1973 to 33.8% in 1988 and a staggering 54% in 1998. Similar trend towards corporate 
concentration in sales, equity and assets is also occurring in other economies dominated by ethnic 
Chinese business firms. 
Finally, there are few studies on the changing nature of capital sourcing for business 
expansion. This is a significant weakness in the context of the spread of global commodity chains 
driven by transnational corporations throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and the growth of 
regional equity and bond markets. Such regional equity and bond markets are heavily dependent 
upon the operation of Chinese family-controlled conglomerates. These regional financial 
markets, via digital technologies, provide real-time links between Chinese family firms and the 
skein of global financial centers. Thus, while Fields’ (1995) study devoted a substantial chapter 
to corporate finance among Taiwanese firms before the 1990s, little substantial and quantitative 
data were provided to illuminate the nature of corporate finance. Instead, he conceded that “no 
comprehensive study of guanxiqiye [related enterprises] financial sources has been attempted. 
Nor can such a study be carried out as long as such financial information remains confidential. In 
fact, one of the motives for choosing the informal, ‘related enterprise’ mode of organization has 
been to facilitate unmonitored financial flows to the groups and among group firms” (Fields, 
1995: 145). In another study of corporate networks among a sample of 107 Chinese business 
firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore in 1992, Zang (1999: 864-865) found that “in 
the big Chinese business sector in East and Southeast Asia, the interlocking directorate has 
replaced traditional informal networks and has performed the function of co-ordination and 
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control in the market place. It is a modern form of maintaining personal relationships in the 
Chinese business community and embodies a class alliance among Chinese capitalists”. He also 
found that family firms are more likely to network than non-family firms, and family ownership 
has a positive effect on interlocking directorates (see also Zang, 2000). But he fell short of 
describing and explaining corporate finance and performance among these Chinese family firms. 
In brief, the study of how Chinese family firms mobilize global capital via domestic and 
international financial markets does not really exist yet (see, however, Shikatani, 1995; Olds and 
Yeung, 1999; Yeung and Olds, 2000b; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002). 
 How then should we approach the financing of Chinese capitalism in a global era? I argue 
that it is important to go beyond an essentialist focus on small-scale Chinese family firms and 
their reliance on network capital among family members and close friends. This call for an 
alternative focus on large Chinese family firms operating across borders does not negate the 
significance of earlier work in the culturalist genre. Rather, it builds on our existing 
understanding of the role of network capital in explaining the rise and growth of Chinese family 
firms in developing Asia economies where capital markets used to be poorly developed and 
financial institutions were so intertwined with politics and nation-building initiatives. As these 
Asian economies have leapfrogged in their technological and economic development during the 
past two decades, many of their leading Chinese family firms have conceivably gone out of their 
“cultural mould” and adopted new management and financial practices that were previously 
unthinkable. Such transformations in Chinese capitalism do not happen only in such international 
financial centers as Hong Kong and Singapore (Wu and Duk, 1995), but also increasingly in such 
emerging financial markets as Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand. In many of these economies, there 
is an interesting juxtaposition of old and new financial practices among Chinese family firms. 
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Some of these new financial practices include (1) tapping into non-Chinese international financial 
institutions for term loans and equity funds; (2) raising capital through public share offering and 
international bond listing and; (3) attracting international equity investors.  
Key Asian cities act as source points to the global financial system, particularly prior to 
the 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis. Hong Kong and Singapore, for example, have long served 
as the “twin capitals” for ethnic Chinese firms (Wu and Duk, 1995; Enright et al., 1997; Wu, 
1997). Both financial centers have also better than median shareholding protection (see La Porta 
et al., 1999: Table 2; 492), despite the large number of Chinese family firms listed on their stock 
exchanges. In the loan syndication business, the two financial centers have catered to customers 
from different geographic regions. While the US$117.5 billion worth of syndicated loans 
arranged by Hong Kong-based financial institutions between 1992 and mid-1996 were more than 
double of that of Singapore, 71.7% of this total was accounted for by borrowers from East Asia, 
many of whom were ethnic Chinese entities. In Singapore, the borrowers were mainly from 
Southeast Asia that together with local borrowers, took up 88.5% of Singapore’s total syndicated 
lending of US$54.6 billion during the same period (Wu, 1997: 13-5). Between 1993 and 1994, 
financial institutions in Hong Kong and Singapore arranged US$6.5 billion and US$8.6 billion 
worth of syndicated loans for Indonesian and Thai companies respectively. Of the total US$38.4 
billion worth of funds under the custody of Singapore’s fund managers at the end of 1993, some 
40% originated from Southeast Asian countries. The bulk of these funds might have come from 
high net-worth ethnic Chinese and their cash-rich corporate entities (Wu and Duk, 1995: 26). 
Among various financial institutions in these Asian economies, banks seem to occupy a 
particularly important position, not least because many of them are Chinese family-owned and 
controlled. Table 1 shows that the shares of banks in financial intermediation in Singapore, 
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Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand during the 1994-1995 period were particularly high 
when compared to their counterparts from the US. Foreign banks were also very significant in 
Hong Kong and Singapore, accounting for around 80% of total assets in the banking sector. In 
Table 2, there are clear differences in the density and role of banks in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
While Hong Kong enjoyed the presence of more than double the number of banks per 1,000 
population than Singapore, the total bank loans in Hong Kong were also significantly larger than 
in Singapore even after we have taken into account of their exchange rate differences. The same 
observation can also be found in the different stock market turnovers and their ratios to GDP 
during the 1990s. These preliminary data indicate the analytical need to focus on banks in the 
development and transformations of Chinese capitalism in East and Southeast Asia. In the case of 
publicly listed Chinese family firms, their relationships with domestic and foreign banks become 
an important nexus in our examination of their changing financial practices and performance, as 
evident in the following two sections. 
****************** 
Tables 1 and 2 here 
****************** 
 
Chinese Family Firms and Their Principal Banks 
 Before I present an analysis of the data on the 157 Chinese family firms listed on the 
Singapore Exchange (formerly the Stock Exchange of Singapore), some notes on the 
methodology of data collection are necessary. The 1996 data on these 157 Chinese family firms 
were originally collected and analyzed in Yeung and Soh (2000). We went through the entire 
pool of public-listed firms manually. The pool of selection came from a total of 355 Mainboard 
and Sesdaq firms listed in Companies Handbook 1997, published by the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore (1998). Companies Handbook 1997 has relevant information on all publicly listed 
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firms from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 1996. Updates for 1998 and 2001 were subsequently 
completed in late 2002 and early 2003 at the Singapore Exchange (http://www.sgx.com), based 
on annual reports of individual companies. 
How then did we distinguish the archetypical category of the “Chinese family firm” that 
was so often discussed synonymously with Chinese capitalism in the literature? In defining the 
Chinese family firm, we took the term “family” to mean persons related by blood or marriage. In 
general, the most commonly found relationships are usually that of father and son/daughter, 
husband and wife, and brother/sister and brother/sister. This will form the core family unit that 
consists of husbands, wives and/or their children. Other relationships may include family 
relatives related by blood or marriage, e.g. cousins, uncles, aunts, and so on. We identified all 
family relationships in sole or substantial shareholding ownership, be it deemed or direct interest, 
of a particular listed Chinese family firms in Singapore. Broadly, we used three criteria to 
identify a Chinese family firm listed on the Singapore Exchange. The first and most obvious 
condition stipulated Chinese ethnicity for the family or the individual in question. The 
determination of ethnicity was done through two ways, firstly, by examining the names on the 
board of directors and substantial shareholdings. If the names were of Chinese origin, for 
example having a surname of Chen, Tan, or Lee, the criterion was therefore satisfied. The second 
way was to confirm through telephone conversations with personnel in the respective listed firms. 
The secretary or personal assistant to the chief executive officer or general manager was usually 
approached to obtain information about the relevant board of directors and, at other times, to 
confirm relationships between several members on the board of directors. Our second criterion in 
relation to family ownership was the most important condition without which no evidence could 
be presented for a listed firm to be constituted as a “family firm”. Substantial shareholdings listed 
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in annual reports were considered in this case. The family (consisting at least two individuals 
related by blood or marriage) must be the largest substantial shareholder (be it deemed or direct 
interest) in the respective listed firm. This is a much stricter definition of family ownership than 
the one used in recent studies of corporate finance and governance because at least two family 
members and substantial shareholders must be identified in each case. In these studies, an 
individual ownership or blockholder of 10%-20% voting rights was often considered sufficient to 
define a family firm (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; Zang, 1999; 2000; Claessens et al., 2000b). Our 
third criteria required family members to occupy important executive positions, e.g. chairman, 
chief executive officer, or managing director. This was not a necessary condition because some 
listed firms might satisfy the second criterion without satisfying the third. In this case, 
professional managers might be employed to take care of the family’s diverse interests. 
With the above stated criteria, the pool of publicly listed firms available in the Companies 
Handbook 1997 was collated manually and a database was set up to facilitate our empirical 
analysis. Variables were identified and data collection could be considered as raw and secondary 
in nature, e.g. consulting annual reports, and making references to Companies Handbook 1997 
and Singapore’s Corporate Family Tree (Datapool, 1999). The database yielded substantial data 
on the internal organization of publicly listed Chinese family firms in Singapore. Although the 
database covered only a certain percentage of the entire population of Chinese family firms (i.e. 
excluding privately owned Chinese family firms), the findings and observations gleaned from 
this kind of analysis can still enrich us about the realities and governance of Chinese family 
businesses in Singapore (see also Zang, 1999; 2000). Altogether, the manual exercise of going 
through 355 public-listed firms (available from Companies Handbook 1997) yielded a total of 
157 Chinese family firms. These family firms made up about 44.2% of the total number of firms 
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listed on the Mainboard and Sesdaq of the Stock Exchange of Singapore in 1996. Their combined 
activities in 1996 amounted respectively to S$37.2 billion (turnover), S$4.9 billion (after-tax 
profits), and S$27.2 billion (fixed assets). About 91% (n=143) of these them also satisfied all 
three criteria. By the end of 2001, some significant corporate transformations occurred among 45 
of these 157 Chinese family firms. Some 18 of them were acquired by other firms and five of 
them were subsequently delisted from the Singapore Exchange. Another 13 were delisted and 14 
experienced significant changes in shareholding (n=7) and board of directors (n=7). Their 
combined activities in 2001 totaled respectively at S$38.8 billion (turnover), S$4.1 billion (after-
tax profits), and S$36.5 billion (fixed assets). 
Table 3 presents the distribution of family shareholdings among these 157 Chinese family 
firms in 1996, 1998 and 2001. In 1996, about 51.3% (n=77) of them had a majority shareholding 
above the 50% threshold. If we take 20% shareholding as the yardstick (see Zang, 1999; 2000), 
then an overwhelming majority of Chinese families 93% (n=140) had a substantial stake in these 
publicly listed firms. Interestingly, this pattern of family shareholding had not changed very 
much by 2001. Some 50.7% (n=69) of them had a majority stake controlled by various families, 
although only 84.5% (n=115) had a substantial stake of over 20% shareholding in these firms. 
This reduction in substantial stake occurred mainly in the 41%-50% category (7% decrease from 
18% in 1996 to 11% in 2001). This finding indicates that corporate restructuring and maneuvers 
during and after the 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis had taken their tolls on some publicly 
listed firms in which Chinese families did not hold a majority stake. Overall, data in Table 3 
point to the relative stability in the shareholding structures of Chinese family firms in Singapore 
during the 1996-2001 period. The implications of this stability for corporate performance will be 
addressed in the next section. 
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****************** 
Table 3 here 
****************** 
 
The pattern of principal banks used by these 157 Chinese family firms, however, shows a 
rather different picture. In Table 4, there was a significant decrease in the number of principal 
banks used by Chinese family firms between 1996 and 2001. In 1996, about 75.7% (n=84) of 
Chinese family firms had one to five principal banks. But this figure increased to 82.8% (n=72) 
in 2001. Meanwhile, the proportion of these firms having six or more principal banks decreased 
over time. This reduction reflects the slowdown in corporate expansion among these Chinese 
family firms in the post-crisis era, the mergers and acquisitions in the domestic banking sector 
(Keppel Bank and Tat Lee Bank in 1998 and United Overseas Bank and Overseas Union Bank in 
2001), and the reserved attitudes of non-Singapore banks towards the short-term growth of these 
family firms. 
****************** 
Table 4 here 
****************** 
 
If we revisit the culturalist perspective on Chinese capitalism, it follows that Chinese 
family firms should be more inclined to use network capital to finance their domestic and 
international operations. Among small and medium enterprises (SMEs), this network capital 
often comes from pooling together investments and savings among family members and an inner 
circuit of close friends. In the case of the largest Chinese family firms, so the culturalist literature 
proposes, the founders and/or family patriarchs often attempt to use their personal relationships 
with other Chinese bankers to secure access to capital and finance. In Singapore’s banking sector 
before 1998, only two domestic banks were government-linked (Development Bank of Singapore 
and Keppel Bank).5 According to interviews with Chinese entrepreneurs (Yeung, 2002), these 
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government-linked banks were notoriously reluctant to extend loans and equity financing to 
Chinese family firms. In fact, a local entrepreneur wrote to Singapore’s most read newspaper and 
openly complained that “all of them [banks in Singapore] were only interested in property 
business and trading – all heavily secured transactions. They had no desire to support a technical 
enterprise. The local banks also have limited experience in small and medium-sized enterprise 
(SME) operations and venture funding” (The Straits Times, 7 July 1999). All other domestic 
banks and finance houses in Singapore prior to 1998 were owned and controlled by leading 
Chinese families: Hong Leong Finance (the Kwek family), Industrial and Commercial Bank (the 
Wee family), Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation (the Lee and the Tan family), Overseas 
Union Bank (the Lien family), Singapore Finance (the Kwek family), Tat Lee Bank (the Goh 
family), and United Overseas Bank (the Wee family). 
Given this predominance of Chinese family-owned banks and finance houses in 
Singapore’s banking sector, we would expect more Chinese family firms listed on the Singapore 
Exchange to use them as their principal banks, particularly those firms with higher shareholding 
by Chinese families. This is because majority-owned family firms are more likely to develop 
strong personal relationships with Chinese banks and the culturalist perspective would like us to 
believe in the positive relationship between family shareholding of family firms and their use of 
Chinese banks. In Table 5, I present results from a simple correlation analysis of the relationship 
between percentages of family shareholding and the number of Singapore banks as principal 
banks. My assumption is that greater family shareholding should correspond with higher use of 
Singapore banks (as a proxy for Chinese family banks). Ironically, the correlation analysis does 
not support the culturalist perspective on the alleged positive relationship between family 
shareholding and the use of Chinese banks as principal banks. Indeed, there is a consistently 
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negative relationship for all three years of 1996, 1998 and 2001 (statistically significant in four 
out of six cases). This finding indicates that the higher is the family share of a publicly listed 
Chinese family firm, the less is its number of Singapore (Chinese) banks as principal banks. It 
refutes tentatively the culturalist interpretation of network capital as the dominant source of 
financing Chinese capitalism. 
****************** 
Table 5 here 
****************** 
 
So what sorts of banks did these Chinese family firms use as their principal banks? I have 
summarized in tables 6 and 7 the geographical origins of principal banks of Chinese family firms 
by country and by region. Two empirical observations clearly stand out. First, the majority of 
principal banks are from outside Singapore. In 1996, only 14 out of 76 principal banks (18.5%) 
were from Singapore (Table 6) and this figure decreased by 50% to only seven Singapore banks 
in 2001, an outcome of the mega mergers and acquisitions during the 1998-2001 period. In Table 
7, however, this small number of Singapore banks accounted for a disproportionately higher 
number of citations as principal banks by Chinese family firms. In 1996, the 14 Singapore banks 
made up 45.1% (n=222) of total citations (N=492) by the 111 Chinese family firms that indicated 
principal banks in their annual reports. Following the decline in the number of Singapore banks 
available as principal banks in 2001, the citation of Singapore banks also decreased by 27% to 
162 in 2001, whereas its relative share of citations remained stable at 45.4%. This result shows 
that during the period 1996-2001, fewer Singapore banks were available as principal banks for 
listed Chinese family firms, though the former enjoyed a relatively higher share of the citations. 
****************** 
Tables 6 and 7 here 
****************** 
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Second, the geographical scope of principal banks is highly diverse, ranging from the 
more obscure bank in South Africa (Amalgamated Banks of South Africa) and the Middle East 
(Arab Banking) to such globalized banks as Citibank (US) and the HSBC (UK). What is 
particularly interesting in Table 6 is the fact that Chinese family firms have well tapped into 
banks from North America and Western Europe as their principal banks. In 1996, banks from 
North America (n=11) and Western Europe (n=23) accounted for 43.4% of the total pool of 
principal banks (N=76). In terms of citations in Table 7, the two regions also made up 37.6% 
(n=185) of total citations. These findings imply that prior to the 1997/1998 Asian economic 
crisis, banks from North America and Western Europe were highly active in financing and 
servicing both the domestic and international operations of Chinese family firms from Singapore. 
In turn, this shows that Chinese capitalism in Singapore has been globalizing in its financial 
outreach during the past decade – a point certainly not anticipated in the existing literature on 
Chinese capitalism. Together with banks from East Asia, Australasia and other regions, non-
Singapore banks contributed to almost 55% of total citations as principal banks. 
By 2001, however, there were some significant changes to the above geographical 
patterns of principal banks. The number of banks available as principal banks decreased by 
21.1% from 76 in 1996 to only 60 in 2001 (Table 6). The decline occurred primarily among 
banks from North America (from 11 in 1996 to 5 in 2001), Japan (from 7 in 1996 to 4 in 2001), 
and Singapore (from 14 in 1996 to 7 in 2001). To a certain extent, this decrease correlates with 
the 15.3% decline in the number of Chinese family firms indicating their principal banks (Table 
4). It also reflects the negative impact of the Asian economic crisis on the Asian operations of 
American and Japanese banks, and the tendency among Chinese family firms to use less principal 
banks as they streamlined their operations and restructured their core business activities. In terms 
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of citations in 2001 (Table 7), banks from all regions except Australasia experienced a dramatic 
reduction in their citations as principal banks of Chinese family firms, although their relative 
percentage shares remained unchanged. The decline ranged from 25.7% for banks from Southeast 
Asia to 33.3% for banks from North America. Banks from Singapore and outside Singapore had 
similar drop in their citations (around 27%). These figures are all well above the 15.3% decrease 
in Chinese family firms indicating principal banks in their annual reports, pointing tentatively to 
the general tendency among these firms to use less principal banks during the 1996-2001 period. 
Economic Crisis and Performance 
 The above descriptive analysis of the Singapore Exchange data challenges the 
conventional wisdom that Chinese family firms rely exclusively on kinship ties and network 
capital to finance their business activities. It shows that Chinese family firms listed on the 
Singapore Exchange have a diversified pool of principal banks and higher family shareholding 
does not necessarily reduce the proportion of non-Singapore banks as principal banks. It remains 
unclear how these findings relate to the corporate performance of these firms during the 1996-
2001 period when many East and Southeast Asian economies experienced their worst-ever 
financial crisis and instability (see different interpretations in Krugman, 1998; Radelet and Sachs, 
1998; Wade and Veneroso, 1998; Johnson et al., 2000; Wade, 2002). Before we explore these 
relationships, it is useful to give a general idea of the extent to which the 1997/1998 Asian 
economic crisis has impacted on the profitability of these 157 Chinese family firms. In 1996, 
these firms enjoyed a combined after-tax profit at S$4.8 billion. In 1998, however, the figure 
decreased very significantly by 62.5% to S$1.8 billion. Data presented in Table 8 reveals clearly 
that while 144 (91.7%) of these 157 Chinese family firms enjoyed after-tax profits in 1996, only 
95 (60.5%) of them did so in 1998. There is thus no question that a large number of publicly 
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listed Chinese family firms in Singapore suffered serious losses from the 1997/1998 Asian 
economic crisis. 
****************** 
Table 8 here 
****************** 
 
 The more significant question is whether there are relationships between the role of 
family ownership and profitability, and between the use of principal banks and profitability. This 
question can potentially inform our understanding of the critical perspective on Asian financial 
markets that involve the participation of Chinese family firms as both providers and recipients of 
financial capital and services. For it might be argued, as the critics of crony capitalism would 
certainly have, that the more a publicly listed firm is owned and controlled by a family, the more 
likely it is to suffer from major losses during the Asian economic crisis. This is because, so the 
argument goes, family control could result in unwieldy diversification and investment decisions 
made by the founders and/or the patriarchs in their own personal or family interests rather than 
the interests of minority shareholders and the public companies in which they have invested. 
Tightly coupled family ownership and control also tends to generate poorer corporate governance 
and greater likelihood of expropriation of minority shareholders in the event of financial 
difficulties and crises. Such an argument against family control of public companies is extremely 
influential during the post-crisis restructuring of many Asian financial markets (e.g. in South 
Korea and Indonesia).  
In Table 9, I use family shareholding as a proxy to measure the extent of family 
ownership and control and correlate the percentage of family shareholding with after-tax profits. 
Correlation analysis is useful here as it tells us about the direction of change between two 
different variables. Since I am not interested in predicting the causality of the exact change (as in 
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regression analysis), correlation analysis is a sufficient tool for my purpose. Although the 
corporate finance literature often uses return on assets (ROA) or return on invested capital 
(ROIC) as the proxy for profitability and performance (e.g. Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Mitton, 
2002), I use after-tax profits as a simplified proxy for performance in my correlation analysis. 
The results presented in Table 9 seem to support the above argument by the critics of Chinese 
capitalism that there are negative correlations between family shareholding and after-tax profits. 
Indeed, in all three years under examination (1996, 1998 and 2001), there is a negative 
correlation between family shareholding and after-tax profits. The results for three particular 
cases are also statistically significant. What these results imply is that higher family shareholding 
of a Chinese family firm seems to correlate with lower after-tax profits or higher losses during 
the 1996-2001 period. 
My evidence also lends some support to the conclusions in several recent studies on the 
relationship between family ownership and corporate performance. In a study of 106 Chinese 
family firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1993, Carney and Gedajlovic (2002: 
137) identified statistically significant positive relationships between tighter coupling of family 
ownership and control and dividends payouts, and negative relationships between tight coupling 
of ownership and control and investment in fixed assets. Their findings suggested that tighter 
family ownership and control leads to lower likelihood of corporate profitability due to higher 
dividend payouts and lower investment in fixed assets. Claessens et al.’s (2000a; 2000b) World 
Bank study of over 5,500 East Asian firms in nine economies during the 1988-1996 period also 
shows that family control helps explain the negative relationship between control rights and 
market evaluation. In another study of the 1997-1998 performance of 398 firms from the five 
crisis countries (Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), Mitton (2002: 
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229) suggested the idea that blockholders of shares who are also involved with management 
could have more opportunity or incentive for expropriation of minority shareholders. Claessens et 
al. (1999) also observed that family ownership tends to reduce the likelihood of an East Asian 
firm to file for bankruptcy, possibly at the expense of minority shareholders. This relationship 
thus explains the survival of some family firms despite their lower or negative profitability during 
the crisis. 
****************** 
Table 9 here 
****************** 
 
 Going back to my earlier point about the financing of Chinese capitalism in a global era, 
it might be useful to speculate on the relationship between the use of principal banks by Chinese 
family firms and their profitability. My proposition is that a Chinese family firm using more and 
geographically diversified principal banks before the crisis is more likely to make profits and less 
susceptible to losses arising from the crisis. This positive relationship can be explained by two 
rationales. First, different principal banks may offer different financial services and investment 
knowledge to a Chinese family firm. This is a point about risk diversification from the 
perspective of the recipients of credits and funds and thus a diversified base of principal banks 
allows these recipients to perform a more effective assessment of the global investment climate 
and credit availability before the onset of the crisis. An excessive reliance on a single or a few 
principal banks may reduce the potential repertoire of market information and financial 
knowledge available among a diverse pool of principal banks. Second, the role of personal 
relationships and relationship banking is less likely to be effective when the number of principal 
banks increases, thereby reducing the propensity for expropriation and fraud before the crisis. 
Different principal banks may have divergent credit requirements and risk-assessment procedures 
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that put significant constraints on both corporate governance and investment strategies of a 
Chinese family firm. We can thus infer that through diversifying principal banks, a Chinese 
family firm wants to tap into the financial strength and knowledge of the chosen principal banks 
rather than to secure capital and credits through personal relationships. This kind of Chinese 
family firms is also more likely to engage in professional management, impersonal decision-
makings and sound corporate governance. 
 In Table 10, I correlate the total number of principal banks of Chinese family firms and 
their after-tax profits in all three years. The positive and statistically significant correlations 
between the number of principal banks and after-tax profits in 1996 and 1998 support my 
proposition that a larger number of principal banks before the crisis might lead to higher 
propensity for profitability in a Chinese family firm during the crisis. There is apparently a 
difference between the use of Singapore and non-Singapore banks as principal banks. Although 
both types of principal banks are positively correlated with the after-tax profits of Chinese family 
firms in 1996, the number of non-Singapore principal banks remains positively correlated with 
after-tax profits in 1998. The negative correlation between the number of Singapore principal 
banks and after-tax profits in 1998 seems to imply that the direct involvement of Chinese family 
banks in Singapore’s corporate sector has a negative impact on profitability during the crisis. 
Taken together, these findings establish the significant role of a diversified pool and geographical 
origin of principal banks in ensuring profitability and corporate governance of Chinese family 
firms. To a certain extent, it explains why many Chinese family firms have moved away from the 
traditional model of financing their business activities through “network capital”. There are clear 
benefits for those Chinese family firms that rely less on the culture of “familism” and more on 
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the culture of professionalism and sound governance structures through their diversification of 
principal banks beyond other Chinese family banks. 
****************** 
Table 10 here 
****************** 
 
Conclusion 
 The debate on the cultural origins and predispositions of Chinese family firms and their 
business activities remains elusive because so much of the literature relies on static analysis that 
tends to produce cultural stereotypes and essentialist observations. In this ongoing debate, the 
powerful role of financial markets as both the vanguard of capitalism and the diffusion center of 
new management norms and regulatory influences has been largely neglected. In this paper, I 
have challenged the conventional wisdom in the literature on Chinese capitalism that 
essentializes the ways in which Chinese family firms finance their business activities. Drawing 
on a large dataset on 157 Chinese family firms listed on the Singapore Exchange, I have shown 
that several cultural stereotypes about these firms and their financial arrangements are out-dated, 
to say the least. As major players in Chinese capitalism, these firms have enormous corporate and 
financial power to effect dynamic changes in the nature and organization of the domestic 
economy of Singapore. I have provided relevant data and conducted statistical analysis on their 
shareholding structures, the geographical origins of their principal banks, and their after-tax 
profits during the 1996-2001 period. I have found good evidence to support my two initial 
propositions that these Chinese family firms have indeed been globalizing their sources of capital 
and this globalization process has certainly contributed to their corporate performance. These 
propositions are particularly significant in the context of the 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis 
during which severe criticisms were leveled against the so-called “crony capitalism” as the 
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fundamental cause of the crisis. While this paper does not add any new empirical evidence to 
explaining the cause of the crisis, it does clarify an important issue about the relationship between 
family control of public companies and their poor performance during and after the crisis. 
 As financial markets in Asia are recovering from the 1997/1998 crisis and new norms of 
corporate finance and legitimation procedures are emerging in these markets, my empirical 
analysis may offer some relevant implications for both researchers and practitioners. First of all, 
if culture were to remain as a useful analytical category, we must conceptualize it as a set of 
social practices that adapt to and change with time and place. While cultural norms – as in the 
case of Chinese family firms – might be influential in determining their relationships with 
financial markets during particular historical moments and in certain geographical contexts, these 
norms can evolve and change in unpredictable directions. The 1990s, for example, witnessed a 
heightened intensity of the globalization processes that put many cultural norms in distress (see 
Berger and Huntington, 2002). The traditional practice of Chinese family firms in the financial 
realm was to rely virtually exclusively on pooling capital among family members and close 
friends. Such a cultural model of financing Chinese family firms remains pervasive today among 
mostly small and medium enterprises. However, as financial capital becomes increasingly 
globalized and many more Chinese family firms are seeking capital on a much larger scale, we 
begin to witness new norms of corporate finance among large and often publicly listed Chinese 
family firms. These norms include the use of non-Chinese banking and financial institutions for 
access to global finance and the decline in the reliance on network capital and personal 
relationships. Whether these norms in financing Chinese capitalism will constitute a new culture 
of finance remains unclear. But in today’s globalizing era, it is clearly absurd to deny any 
changes and transformations in the nature and organization of Chinese capitalism. What this 
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paper has shown is that there is much for us to learn from researching into the interactions 
between Chinese family firms and regional/global financial markets. 
 In terms of practice, my analysis implies that family ownership and control might not be 
too much a regulatory hazard if an informal regulatory process through various stakeholders such 
as principal banks can be put in place. The effectiveness of such informal regulatory process may 
explain why more than 75% of all registered companies in the industrialized economies remain 
family businesses and a third of listed companies in the Fortune 500 have families at their helm 
(Becht et al., 2003). Even in the UK where ownership is rapidly dispersed throughout the 
twentieth century, Franks et al. (2003) found that founding families retained board control well 
beyond the sale of their ownership stake (see also Chandler, 1990). According to a recent study 
of corporate ownership around the world (La Porta et al., 1999: 481), even Microsoft Corporation 
has been classified as a family-owned firm, 23.7% controlled by Bill Gates. Prima facie, there are 
thus no inherent limits to the growth of family firms in an era of global finance (Yeung, 2000c). 
In fact, if such informal process works well, shareholders of Chinese family firms – both majority 
and minority – might benefit from better corporate governance and improved profitability. This 
potential improvement in corporate governance is particularly significant in developing 
economies in which many Chinese family firms thrive and shareholder protection and judicial 
efficiency are inadequate. Klapper and Love (2002), for example, found that good corporate 
governance matters a lot more in countries with weak shareholder protection and poor judicial 
efficiency. In this sense, the latent pressures from principal banks may foster a kind of voluntary 
action on the part of Chinese family firms to take a stakeholder approach, rather than a personal 
or family approach, to corporate governance and performance. This process happens in many 
East and Southeast Asian economies in which banks play a critical role in financial 
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intermediation (see Table 1). There is no question about the future increase in the extent to which 
Chinese capitalism works with global finance. The critical issue is whether such a co-evolution of 
Chinese capitalism and global finance can take place within the existing framework of the global 
financial architecture in which financial crises and instabilities seem to be rather prevalent. 
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Endnotes
                                                 
1 I use “home” in inverted commas because many East and Southeast Asian economies might not 
be the birthplace for the first and, sometimes, second generations of many ethnic Chinese people. 
Unless otherwise specified, the term “economies” is used in lieu of “countries” because while 
economies like Hong Kong and Taiwan are populated by the largest concentration of ethnic 
Chinese outside mainland China, it is hotly debatable whether they can be known as “countries” 
in their own right. 
2 The term “overseas Chinese” may be contentious to some scholars of ethnic Chinese who are 
living outside mainland China. The term is related to the Chinese term huaqiao (Chinese national 
abroad) which has been sharply criticised in Southeast China for its implications that Chinese 
born abroad with status as a citizen in another nation are still Chinese in essence and huaren 
(ethnic Chinese) has become more politically acceptable. In English, overseas Chinese is usually 
used to include huaqiao, huaren, and residents of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau (tong bao) 
who are considered to compatriots living in parts of the territory of China temporarily outside 
mainland Chinese control. See Wang (1991; 2000) and Ma (2003) for the origin and status of 
ethnic Chinese living outside mainland China. Throughout this paper, I will refer to “ethnic 
Chinese” or to specific groups (e.g. Hong Kong entrepreneurs) rather than “overseas Chinese” in 
my discussions of research materials. But references to the literature sometimes require reference 
to “overseas Chinese” to be clear. In such cases, I will use inverted quotations to illustrate my 
discomfort with the term. 
3 See, for example, the collapse of Peregrine Investment Holdings from Hong Kong in Yeung 
(1999). 
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4 See, for example, Wong (1988), Redding (1990), Hamilton (1991), Menkhoff (1993), Chan and 
Chiang (1994), East Asia Analytical Unit (1995), Lever-Tracy et al. (1996), Weidenbaum and 
Hughes (1996), Hefner (1998), Douw et al. (1999; 2001), Chan (2000), Gomez and Hsiao (2001), 
Menkhoff and Gerke (2002) and Yao (2002). 
5 The third government-linked bank was the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) that was merged 
with the Development Bank of Singapore in July 1998 (Yeung, 2000b). As a savings bank, the 
POSB did not involve much in corporate loans to Chinese family firms. 
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TABLE 1. The Nature of Banks in Selected Asian and Developed Economies, 1994-1995 
 
 
Economy 
 
Bank Share in 
Financial 
Intermediation1 
 
 
State-Owned 
Banks (% of 
total assets) 
 
Foreign Banks 
(% of total 
assets) 
 
Non-Interest 
Operating 
Costs2 
 
Net Interest 
Margins2 
 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
 
South Korea 
Japan 
Germany 
United States 
 
 
- 
71 
91 
64 
80 
75 
 
38 
79 
77 
23 
 
0 
0 
48 
8 
57 
7 
 
13 
0 
503 
0 
 
783 
80 
4 
16 
5 
7 
 
5 
2 
4 
22 
 
 
1.5 
1.4 
2.4 
1.6 
1.3 
1.9 
 
1.7 
0.8 
1.1 
3.7 
 
2.2 
1.6 
3.3 
3.0 
2.0 
3.7 
 
2.1 
1.1 
1.4 
3.7 
 
1 Assets as a percentage of the assets of banks and non-bank financial institutions. 
2 As a percentage of total assets, averaged over the 1990-1994 period. 
3 Not directly comparable to percentages for other countries. 
Source: Guillén (2001: Table 7.1; 185). 
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TABLE 2. Financial Markets and Institutions in Hong Kong and Singapore, 1960-1999 (in 
$million) 
 
  
Growth Rate (%) 
 
Annual Figures 
 
Hong Kong 
 
 
1961- 
67 
 
1967-
80 
 
1980-
90 
 
1990-
98 
 
1961 
 
1967 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
 
1998 
 
Number of banks 
   Per 1,000 population 
 
Total bank loans (HK$) 
   Manufacturing (%) 
   General Commerce 
   Financial industries 
   Transport & Comm. 
   Construction 
   Individuals 
      For business 
Prime rates (%) 
 
Stock market turnover 
Ratio to GDP at     current prices 
(%) 
 
 
3.9 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
-
11.2 
- 
54.0
-
157.2
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2232
-
 
4.0 
- 
 
41.3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
18.3 
- 
 
-1.0 
- 
 
20.4 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
54.4 
- 
59
1.9
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
6.0
1414.2
19.0
75
1.9
5401
19.8
31.4
3.1
4.1
16.4
13.1
5.3
7.5
305.2
2.0
 
415 
8.1 
 
124287 
10.7 
25.9 
5.3 
9.3 
15.5 
19.7 
5.1 
13.5 
 
95684 
67.5 
599
10.6
689369
7.2
10.8
15.2
6.0
15.7
30.0
3.2
10.5
288715
49.6
544
8.1
1957752
4.8
9.2
11.8
5.4
21.3
37.4
1.2
9.94
1701112
134.2
 
Singapore 
 
 
1962- 
70 
 
1970-
80 
 
1980-
90 
 
1990-
99 
 
1962 
 
1970 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
 
1999 
 
Number of banks 
   Per 1,000 population 
 
Total bank loans (S$) 
   Manufacturing (%) 
   General Commerce 
   Financial industries 
   Transport & Comm. 
   Construction 
   Individuals 
Prime rates (%) 
 
Stock market turnover 
Ratio to GDP at      current prices 
(%) 
Contributions to central provident 
fund (S$) 
Ratio to GCF at      current prices 
(%) 
 
 
- 
- 
 
21.8 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
 
45.7 
 
- 
-
-
75.7
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
85.9
-
124.4
-
4.1
-
16.9
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
51.9
-
19.3
-
0.9
-
15.5
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
11.4
-
13.7
-
 
- 
- 
 
731.1 
12.8 
51.6 
6.7 
2.7 
2.6 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
 
30.6 
 
9.6 
 
- 
- 
 
2167.7 
34.1 
31.3 
3.6 
1.5 
8.4 
13.1 
8.00 
 
746.9 
12.9 
 
 
156.4 
 
7.0 
 
97 
4.0 
 
20206.9 
21.6 
39.3 
10.4 
6.4 
9.3 
7.0 
13.60 
 
7806.1 
31.1 
 
 
2296.0 
 
19.7 
 
141 
4.7 
 
57696.4 
13.0 
23.7 
17.2 
3.0 
22.3 
13.4 
7.73 
 
36756.0 
55.3 
 
 
7174.2 
 
29.5 
 
154 
4.0 
 
147178 
7.9 
13.5 
14.3 
2.5 
39.8 
14.7 
5.80 
1998 
74479.4 
52.7 
 
 
16000.4 
 
33.9 
 
Sources: Census and Statistics Department (various years); Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(various years). 
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TABLE 3.  Distribution of Family Shareholdings Among Chinese Family 
Firms Listed on the Singapore Exchange, 1996, 1998 and 2001 
 
 
Family 
 
Number and Percentage 
 
Change 
Shareholdings 
(%) 
1996 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
between 1996 
and 2001 (%) 
     
1 – 10 0 (0.0) 3 (2.1) 6 (4.4) 4.4 
11 – 20 10 (6.7) 14 (9.7) 15 (11.0) 4.3 
21 – 30 23 (15.3) 24 (16.7) 20 (14.7) -0.6 
31 – 40 13 (8.7) 14 (9.7) 11 (8.1) -0.6 
41 – 50 27 (18.0) 19 (13.2) 15 (11.0) -7.0 
50.01 – 60 30 (20.0) 28 (19.4) 29 (21.3) 1.3 
61 – 70 23 (15.3) 21 (14.6) 18 (13.2) -2.1 
71 – 80 16 (10.7) 13 (9.0) 10 (7.4) -3.3 
81 – 90 7 (4.7) 6 (4.2) 11 (8.1) 3.4 
91 – 100 1 (0.6) 2 (1.4) 1 (0.7) 0.1 
Total 
 
150 (100) 144 (100) 136 (100) - 
NA 7 13 21 - 
     
 
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies. 
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TABLE 4. Chinese Family Firms Listed on the Singapore Exchange and Their Principal 
Banks, 1996, 1998 and 2001 
(percentage in parentheses) 
 
 
No. of 
 
Number and Percentage 
 
Change 
principal 
banks 
1996 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
between 1996 
and 2001 (%) 
     
1 – 5 84 (75.7) 77 (78.6) 72 (82.8) 7.1 
6 – 10 19 (17.1) 16 (16.3) 12 (13.8) -3.3 
11 – 15 6 (5.4) 3 (3.1) 2 (2.3) -3.1 
16 – 20 1 (0.9) 1 (1.1) 0 (0.0) -0.9 
21 – 25 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0.0 
26 – 30 1 (0.9) 1 (1.1) 1 (1.1) 0.2 
Subtotal 
 
111 (100) 98 (100) 87(100) -15.3 
No indicated 
principal banks 
46 (29.3) 59 (37.6) 70 (44.6) 15.3 
Total 
 
157 (100) 157 (100) 157 (100) - 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies. 
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TABLE 5. Correlation Between Percentages of Family Shareholding  
and the Number of Singapore Banks as Principal Banks of Chinese Family Firms Listed on 
the Singapore Exchange, 1996, 1998 and 2001 
 
 
Independent 
  
No. of Singapore Banks as Principal Banks 
Variables   1996 1998 2001 
 
     
Family Share 
percentage, 1996 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.270** -.306** -.146 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .003 .190 
  N 
 
107 92 82 
Family Share 
percentage, 1998 
Pearson 
Correlation 
- -.352** -.181 
  Sig. (2-tailed) - .001 .102 
  N 
 
- 93 83 
Family Share 
percentage, 2001 
Pearson 
Correlation 
- 
 
- 
 
-.220* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) - - .042 
  N - - 86 
     
 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies. 
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 TABLE 6. Country of Origin of Principal Banks of Chinese Family Firms Listed on the 
Singapore Exchange, 1996, 1998 and 2001 
(percentage in parentheses) 
 
 
Origins of  principal 
 
Number and Percentage 
 
Change 
banks 1996 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
between 1996 
and 2001 (%) 
     
Canada & US 11 (14.5) 11 (15.3) 5 (8.3) -54.5 
     
Australia & New Zealand 3 (3.9) 3 (4.2) 4 (6.7) 33.3 
     
France 3 (3.9) 5 (6.9) 5 (8.3) 66.7 
Germany 7 (9.2) 7 (9.7) 6 (10.0) -14.3 
Luxemborg & 
Switzerland 
4 (5.3) 4 (5.6) 2 (3.3) -50.0 
The Netherlands 4 (5.3) 3 (4.2) 4 (6.7) 0.0 
UK 5 (6.6) 5 (6.9) 5 (8.3) 0.0 
     
China 3 (3.9) 4 (5.6) 4 (6.7) 33.3 
Hong Kong SAR 4 (5.3) 4 (5.6) 4 (6.7) 0.0 
Japan 7 (9.2) 4 (5.6) 4 (6.7) -42.9 
Malaysia 7 (9.2) 7 (9.7) 6 (10.0) -14.3 
Singapore 14 (18.5) 12 (16.7) 7 (11.7) -50.0 
     
Others 4 (5.4) 3 (4.2) 4 (6.7) 0.0 
     
Total 76 (100) 72 (100) 60 (100) -21.1 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies. 
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TABLE 7. Regional Origins of Principal Banks Cited by Chinese Family Firms Listed on 
the Singapore Exchange, 1996, 1998 and 2001 
(percentage in parentheses) 
 
 
Origins of 
 
Number of Citations and Percentages 
 
Absolute Change 
principal banks 1996 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
between 1996 and 
2001 (%) 
     
Southeast Asia 268 (54.5) 235 (55.0) 199 (55.7) -25.7 
Western Europe 140 (28.5) 123 (28.8) 99 (27.7) -29.3 
North America 45 (9.1) 40 (9.4) 30 (8.4) -33.3 
East Asia 34 (6.9) 24 (5.6) 23 (6.4) -32.4 
Australasia 5 (1.0) 4 (0.9) 5 (1.4) 0.0 
Other regions 0 (0.0) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.3) - 
Total 
 
492 (100) 427 (100) 357 (100) -27.4 
Singapore 222 (45.1) 199 (46.6) 162 (45.4) -27.0 
Outside Singapore 
 
270 (54.9) 228 (53.4) 195 (54.6) -27.8 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies. 
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TABLE 8.  Profit and Loss Among Chinese Family Firms Listed on the 
Singapore Exchange, 1996, 1998 and 2001 
 
 
Profit and Loss 
 
Number and Percentage 
 1996 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
    
Profit 144 (91.7) 95 (60.5) 101 (64.3) 
Loss 13 (8.3) 54 (34.4) 39 (24.8) 
NA 0 (0.0) 8 (5.1) 17 (10.8) 
Total 
 
157 (100) 157 (100) 157 (100) 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies. 
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TABLE 9. Correlation Between Percentages of Family Shareholding  
and After Tax Profits of Chinese Family Firms Listed on the Singapore Exchange, 1996, 
1998 and 2001 
 
 
Independent 
  
Profits after tax 
Variables   1996 1998 2001 
 
     
Family Share 
percentage, 1996 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.203* -.132 -.170* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .013 .116 .050 
  N 150 142 133 
 
Family Share 
percentage, 1998 
Pearson 
Correlation 
- -.115 -.188* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) - .170 .028 
  N - 144 136 
 
Family Share 
percentage, 2001 
Pearson 
Correlation 
- 
 
- 
 
-.093 
  Sig. (2-tailed) - - .278 
  N - - 137 
     
 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies. 
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TABLE 10. Correlation Between the Use of Principal Banks  and 
After Tax Profits of Chinese Family Firms Listed on the Singapore Exchange, 1996, 1998 
and 2001 
 
 
Independent Variables 
  
Profits after tax 
 
 
  1996 1998 2001 
 
     
Total No. of Principal 
Banks, 1996 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.970** .841** .937** 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
  N 158 150 
 
141 
Total No. of Principal 
Banks, 1998 
Pearson 
Correlation 
- .842** .937** 
  Sig. (2-tailed) - .000 .000 
  N - 150 141 
 
Total No. of Principal 
Banks, 2001 
Pearson 
Correlation 
- 
 
- 
 
.936** 
  Sig. (2-tailed) - - .000 
  N - - 141 
 
No. of non-Singapore 
Principal Banks, 1996 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.969** .841** .934** 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
  N 158 150 141 
 
No. of Singapore banks 
as Principal Banks, 1996 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.968** .838** .938** 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
  N 157 149 
 
140 
 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Author’s compilation from annual reports of companies. 
